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 Executive Summary 
 
The extent by which children’s choices depend on their parents’ characteristics is a long debated 
issue in social sciences.  More importantly, the mechanism of the observed similarities of choices 
between generations is of consequences not only for scientists but also for policy makers. The 
issue can be briefly summarised as whether the link between generations is causal, or to put it 
simply to what extent is the link due to a nature or a nurture effect. The answer to this question 
has important implications for the design of policy. This research focuses on educational choices 
between generations in the UK.  Since education has been one of the priorities of the labour 
governments, these results are important to design policies for children at risk of under-
achievement. Also findings that educational investments have positive effect on the second 
generation would suggest social returns to education, which should then be included in cost-
benefit analysis of educational investment. 
The difficulties in determining whether parental education has a causal effect on the 
educational choice of their children is to eliminate genetic effects and other characteristics 
explaining educational choices, that may be transmitted from one generation to the next, such as 
motivation. The literature has so far relied on comparing adopted and natural children or children 
of twins and has reached mixed conclusions regarding the causal effect of parental education on 
the attainment of their children.  
Here, as in some recent papers for Norway and the US, we rely on a policy reform (the 
1972 Education Act) which increased the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16. Hence, 
independently of their own characteristics, some parents had an extra year of education compared 
to parents from the previous cohort; this can be seen as a natural experiment where depending on 
birth cohorts, parents were allocated a minimum school leaving age. In our favoured 
specification, we also account for possible trends in education. We compare the investment in 
post compulsory education for children of the pre- and post- reform parents. This is an outcome 
of interest as early school leaving age is considered a problem in the UK, and currently about 
25% of pupils leave school at 16. Compared to the previous literature we simultaneously estimate 
the education of both parents. Additionally, we also state the importance of accounting for the 
relationship of the parental figure and provide results for natural and step-parents. 
To conduct the research, a dataset containing information on the schooling attainment of 
two generations is needed. We rely on the Family Resource Survey, a national dataset, from 
which we pooled data from 1994 to 2002. As in other nationally representative datasets, parental 
 information is only available if the two generations live in the same household. To limit selection 
effects, as children leave the parental nest, we only keep children aged 16 to 18 living with at 
least one parental figure. Whilst selection is limited for the 16 years old, only 88% of 18 years 
old follow this criterion. However, we show that our results are not significantly different 
between age groups. 
This estimation strategy only identifies the effect of parental education for parents who 
were affected by the reform. Other research has shown that only individuals who wanted to leave 
school at the first opportunity increased their schooling whilst higher achievers did not. Thus, the 
estimates are only valid for individuals with a lower taste for schooling. Somehow, this is a 
measure of interest, since these individuals are the one more likely to be treated by a reform 
increasing the minimum school leaving age, and their children also tend to be more at risk of low 
achievement.  
 
The main findings are: 
- Focusing on children living with their natural parents, it cannot be ruled out that the effect 
of parental education on their children’s educational achievement is causal. Each extra-
year of education at the parental generation increases the probability of staying on after 
post compulsory education by 3 to 4 percentage points when the exogeneity of education 
is assumed but by up to 8% when this assumption is relaxed.  
- We do not find significant differences in the influence of father’s or mother’s schooling 
on their children’s educational achievement. However, when accounting for the sex of 
children, only the same-sex parent has a significant effect on the schooling attainment of 
the child. 
- Including a measure of paternal wage does not significantly affect the effect of parental 
education, thus assuming the exogeneity of paternal income, the effect of parental 
education is not due to an income effect and appears causal. 
 
The main policy recommendations are: 
- There is a knock-on effect of education from one generation to the next. Policies, such 
as education maintenance allowance, which focus on preventing early drop out, may have 
even greater benefits, since the offspring of treated individuals will also have higher 
education as a result of the policy. Thus the returns to society of investing in education 
are substantial. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
Parents and the family environment influence the behaviour and decisions taken by adolescents. 
There is a tradition for social scientists to study this intergenerational link and its effects on child 
development, health and various adult outcomes. Economists have mainly focused on the effect 
of parental background on income, social class, or exit from poverty. Typically these studies 
have found a strong link between the earnings of the father and his offspring.  For example, the 
intergenerational correlation in earnings between father and son reaches between 0.40 and 0.50 
in the US (Solon, 1999) and 0.60 in the UK (Dearden et al, 1997). 
The mechanism of this intergenerational correlation in earnings is still subject to debate, 
but education is a likely culprit. The elasticity for intergenerational mobility in education ranges 
from 0.14 to 0.45 in the US (Mulligan, 1999) and 0.25 to 0.40 in the UK (Dearden et al., 1997). 
The common view is that more educated parents provide an environment, which improves their 
children’s opportunities and decision processes. This assumption was, for example, the base of 
World Bank programmes to improve female education with evidence that more educated 
mothers have healthier children1.  There is also a wealth of evidence on the positive relationship 
between parental education, especially mother’s education, and offspring’s education2. Policies 
increasing education appear to have a positive effect on the second generation.  
Whilst intergenerational correlation is education has been largely documented, the current 
debate is on the causality of this link. This knowledge has important consequences for designing 
policies reducing educational inequality. This is an important issue, especially in Britain where 
the recent governments have targeted breaking the cycle of poverty between generations and 
reducing the proportion of children leaving school at 16. Interventions on the parental generation 
                                                           
1 This relationship between mother’s education and children birth weight (a main predictor of child health) is found 
in the developing world (Behrman, 1997) but also in the US (Currie and Moretti, 2003). 
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will generate social returns on the second generation only if the intergenerational educational 
link is causal, due to nurture, rather than just reflecting a nature (selection) effect. Finding small 
or no direct effect of parental education on their children would advocate policies targeted 
directly at the second generation children. 
The next section reviews the literature. The identification strategy, which relies on a 
change in the school leaving age legislation at the parental generation to estimate the causal 
effect of parental education, is presented in the third section. The British data used for the 
analysis are presented in section 4, as well as some preliminary analysis of the intergenerational 
link in education. Section 5 reports the results of the base models as well as tests of the validity 
of the identifying strategy.  The robustness of the results is assessed in section 6. This is 
followed by concluding remarks.   
To summarise, when focusing on natural children, the intergenerational link in education 
is causal. The social returns to education on the second generation double when assuming the 
endogeneity of parental education. However, these results identify the effect of parental 
schooling for a group of parents with a distaste for education, and may not reflect the social 
return that a policy increasing education for another group of parents may have. Nevertheless, 
this is the strength of this estimation strategy since the children of parents with a lower taste for 
schooling are likely to be the most at risk of not maximising their education potential.  For 
natural children, intergenerational link is only found with the same-sex parent. Non natural 
parents have no or a detrimental effect on the educational attainment of children, and severely 
reduce the estimates when included in the sample. We provide some evidence that the parental 
effect is direct and not due to an income effect, reduced fertility or neighbourhood 
characteristics.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 See Behrman (1997) for an extensive review of this literature, focusing mostly on the US and developing 
countries.   
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2 Previous Literature 
 
The correlation in education between generations has three possible channels: liquidity 
constraint, causal or nature. As private returns to education are large, less educated parents are 
more likely to face liquidity constraint preventing their children from fulfilling their schooling 
potential (Becker and Tomes, 1986). This is the basis of policies of financial support for the 
poorest, like the Education Maintenance Allowance in the UK where poorer pupils receive a 
weekly allowance conditional on staying in post-compulsory schooling3. However, Cameron 
and Heckman (1998) for the US or Chevalier and Lanot (2002) for the UK, show that the effect 
of financial constraints on educational choice is less important than the effect of family 
background (mainly parental education). Thus, the most cost-efficient interventions are those 
provided at an earlier stage of the child’s life or even at the parental generation4.  
Parents’ decision to invest in their own education was affected by their own observable 
and unobservable characteristics.  Some of these characteristics may be correlated with 
parenting skills whist others are genetically transmitted from parents to children5, thus 
generating a correlation between parents’ and offspring’s schooling.  In order to identify the 
causal effect of parental education, researchers have relied on three identifying strategies: twin 
parents, adopted children or instrumental variables.  
As a direct way to control for unobservable genetic effects, Behrman and Rosenzweig 
(2002) use pairs of twin parents and compare the educational choices of their respective 
                                                           
3 See DfES (2002) et al. (2003) for an evaluation of the EMA experiment. 
4 See Carneiro and Heckman (2003) for a review and comparison of various interventions targeting at closing the 
educational gap between rich and poor in the US. Blanden and Gregg (2004) also provide a review, including UK 
evidence, on family income effects through out the life of the child. 
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children.  Assuming the exogeneity of parental education, each year of maternal schooling 
increases her children’s years of education by 0.13 years while the effect of paternal schooling is 
about twice as large. However, between cousins estimates, which eliminates the mother’s 
unobservable characteristics (since monozygotic twins have identical genetic background), lead 
to a negative (but insignificant) effect of mother’s education on her child’s educational 
attainment.  This counter-intuitive result implies that more educated mothers switch from time-
intensive tasks to information-intensive tasks, the net effect on their children’s education being 
negative.  This study contradicts the general view that mother’s schooling has a larger effect 
than her husband’s schooling on the achievement of their children. As well as the usual 
shortcomings of twin estimates (see Bound and Solon, 1999 for example), this identifying 
strategy only provides unbiased estimate for one parent (the one with a twin) even after 
accounting for assortative mating. Furthermore, Antonovics and Goldberger (2003) demonstrate 
that the results are sensitive to the selection of children aged 18 and above rather than ten, and 
with completed schooling. 
Sacerdote (2002) and Plug (2004) compare adopted and natural children to estimate the 
causal effect of parental education.  These studies report that mother’s education had an 
insignificant effect on the educational attainment of adopted children, whilst the paternal effect 
remains significant (0.20 year for each year of paternal education) even after accounting for 
family income6.  Comparing natural and adopted children allows to net-out the genetic effect. 
Estimates based on adopted children may be biased, as they typically compare children in 
different families and therefore assume that adoptive and natural families provide an identical 
environment. Furthermore, they assume that adopted children are randomly allocated to 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 For example, the intergenerational correlation in IQ is 0.42 for children living with their parents and 0.22 for those 
brought apart (Feldman et al., 2000). 
6 Sacerdote uses the British National Child Development Survey while Plug uses a longitudinal survey of 
Wisconsin high-school leavers respectively. 
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families, and that children are randomly given for adoption7. Bjorklund et al. (2004), using a 
register of Swedish adoptees, test that the various biases due to the non-randomness of adoptions 
do not affect the conclusions and state that half of the parental schooling effects disappears 
when controlling for the genetic background. In their simpler model, each year of adoptive 
maternal education adds 0.05 years of schooling to the child or increases the likelihood of 
attending university by 6 percentage points. Paternal effects are about 40 per cent higher.   
These identifying strategies do not eliminate the non-genetic endogeneity that stems from 
unobservable characteristics in educational choice that are also correlated with parenting skills. 
In this paper, an alternative strategy to identify the effect of parental education on their 
offspring’s schooling choices is used. One would like to randomly allocate parental education to 
estimate its effects on children. This is obviously impossible, but natural experiments that are 
fairly close to this set-up exist. Changes in the minimum school leaving age (SLA) mean that the 
educational choice of parents was exogenously affected, at least for those wishing to leave 
school at the first opportunity. Some parents experienced an extra year of education compared to 
parents born just before the reform.  This discontinuity can be exploited to identify the 
exogenous effect of parental education on their children’s education. 
Black et al. (2003) rely on a change in SLA in Norway during the Sixties. They report that 
the effect of parental education on children’s educational achievement is greatly reduced and, 
with the exception of the mother-son relationship (0.17), become insignificant when parental 
education is assumed endogenous (this assumption is not tested). The rather small effects of 
parental education in Norway may also be specific to the rather egalitarian and homogeneous 
society characteristic of Nordic countries (see for example Bjorklund et al, 2002).  Oreopoulos 
                                                           
7 This condition may not be sufficient to identify nature and nurture effects, since adopted and natural children may 
have different characteristics or treated differently in school or society (especially when of different race from their 
parents) or faced stigma to adoption. Additionally, adoptive family may provide a different environment to children 
(wealth, attention to child). As evidence of differences in the environment of adopted and natural children, 
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et al. (2003) relies on variation in SLA across states and time in the US, using aggregate data 
from the Census. Rather than the upward biased expected from omitted variable bias, the 
parental effect on grade repetition for children aged 7 to 15 doubles when instrumented, which is 
consistent with a local average treatment effect interpretation. However, their estimates may be 
biased due to measurement error in the independent variable affecting about 20 per cent of the 
observations (Hausman, 2001) and aggregation of the data (Hanushek et al., 1996). None of 
these papers account for assortative mating as they estimate the effect of each parent separately8 
biasing the estimates upwards. Additionally, they do not control whether the child lives with her 
natural parents which impacts on parental altruism (Case et al., 2000).  
This paper aims to determine whether the effect of parental education on their children’s 
schooling attainment is causal by using a change in SLA in Britain which took place in the 
Seventies. The variation in the timing of the policy is limited to a discrepancy between England 
and Wales, and Scotland where the policy was introduced three years later. To eliminate 
potential trend effects, our favoured model includes quadratic in birth cohort for both parents, 
and uses as instrument not only the reform but also interactions between the reform dummy on 
these quadratic functions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Maughan et al (1998) find that adoptees performed more positively than non-adopted children from similar families 
on childhood tests of reading, mathematics, and general ability. 
8 Oreopoulos et al.(2003) provide a table with estimates for both parents jointly. Whilst they report point estimates 
that are similar to those obtained in separate equations, it is unclear whether this rule out that their estimates are 
biased upward due to assortative mating, since they are obtained with aggregate data. 
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3 Model of Intergenerational Spill-Over 
 
The conventional wisdom is that parental education has a positive effect on the education of 
their children. Here we consider a linear reduced form equation describing the schooling choice 
( cjS ) of the child in family j: 
jj
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j
d
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m
j
m
S
c
j XSSS ebb +++=      (1) 
where subscripts c, m or d define respectively the schooling of the child, mother or father 
in family j. The schooling of the child is assumed to depend linearly on the schooling 
achievement of her parents (S) and some other characteristics of the family (Xj). Since many of 
the characteristics of the child’s environment are correlated with parental education, we adopt, 
as in the rest of the literature, a parsimonious model, and in the base model, include only the 
gender and age of the child, region of residence and, for each parent, a quadratic in birth year. 
Additionally, we control for calendar effects and trends in reported education, by controlling for 
the month and the year the survey was conducted.  In subsequent models, we include measures 
of parental income and labour force participation, and number of dependent siblings and 
neighbourhood quality to assess whether the effect of parental education is direct or due to a 
change in the above mentioned characteristics.  
Assuming that gjS  (where the subscript g stands for m or d) is independent of ej leads to 
biased estimates of the effect of parental education on the child’s educational choice9.  The 
omitted variables are likely to be positively correlated with educational choices, thus the 
estimates of parental education would be biased upwards. To instrument parental education, we 
                                                           
9 Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) also assume that mjS  is correlated with 
d
jS  due to assortative mating. More 
educated women tend to marry more educated men who potentially have a higher earning potential.  They estimate 
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rely on their date of birth to determine whether they were affected by the reform of school 
leaving age (RoSLA). For each parent we estimate the following equation.  
g
jj
g
j
g
R
g
j XRoSLAS ugg ++=        (2) 
To account for possible unobservable characteristics explaining the choice of both parents, 
the two equations are estimated simultaneously. Since parents are typically not from the same 
cohort, there is some variation in the instrument, thus this identifying strategy accounts for 
assortative mating. The predicted educational attainment of each parent, rather than the observed 
one, is then used to estimate (1). Standard errors are obtained by a 500-replication bootstrap of 
the two-step procedure. 
This identifying strategy may lead to biased results due to time trends in educational 
attainment. In a second model, we include RoSLA and interactions between RoSLA and the 
quadratic function in the cohort of birth as instruments for each parent’s education. Thus, we no 
longer assume that the effect of the change in SLA was homogenous for all post-reform cohorts. 
Additionally, the change in compulsory schooling mostly affected the educational decision of 
pupils who wanted to leave school at the first opportunity. In a signalling model of education, 
children not directly affected by the reform may also increase their schooling in order to 
maintain their signal but Chevalier et al. (2003) show that the change in the school leaving age 
did not lead to a large change in the distribution of post-16 schooling, rejecting the signalling 
model. Thus, the estimates can be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment Effect (Imbens and 
Angrist, 1994). The population identifying the LATE is also the one likely to be targeted by 
policy interventions, hence the estimates are of interest 
The estimates on the effect of parental education may be biased upward since all children 
have to remain in school up to the age of 16. However, Oreopoulos et al. (2003) show that this 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
that “ a women of given endowments who increases her schooling by one year would attract a mate with 0.4 more 
years of schooling” (p328). 
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bias may not be substantial, first by using cross-state variations in the SLA legislation between 
generation and secondly, since the estimates of parental education on lower grade repetition and 
high-school drop out are not statistically different from each others. 
 
 
4 Data 
 
As most other surveys, the British Family Resources Survey (FRS) surveys children aged 
16 to 18 living at home, thus parental information can be matched to the child’s record10.  
To achieve a reasonable sample size, nine cross-sections from the FRS (1994-2002) are 
pooled leading to a sample of 18,715 individuals aged between 16 and 18 at the time of the 
interview. Only teenagers living in the parental nest can be matched11, which represents 94 
per cent of the population of interest. The proportion of teenagers not studying full-time is 
25 per cent for those living with their parents but 70 per cent for those living on their own. 
The proportion of teenagers living outside the parental nest is also disproportionately female 
(70 per cent).  The selection becomes more severe with older teenagers; whilst 98 per cent 
of 16 years old are observed living with at least one of their parents, this proportion is down 
to 88 per cent for the 18 years old.  Thus, we test the sensitivity of our results by running 
regressions separately for each age cohort. Additionally, the analysis is conducted for two 
subgroups: children living with two parental figures and children living with both natural 
parents. The two groups are virtually undistinguishable, so focusing on children living with 
both natural parents does not lead to further selection bias (see Appendix 1).  
                                                           
10 The FRS is a yearly cross section survey of household living in Great Britain sponsored by the Department of 
Work and Pensions. The aim is to monitor social security programmes and forecast benefit expenditures. The yearly 
sample size is in the region of 40,000 individuals. 
11 We define parents as natural, adoptive, step or foster parent. The dataset does not distinguish between natural and 
adoptive parents. See data Appendix 1. 
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The relation of interest in this paper is the intergenerational educational choice. As we 
concentrate on children living with their parents, completed schooling is not observed for 
the second generation. Instead, the focus is on staying in education beyond the compulsory 
school-leaving age12. This is a statistic of interest in the UK, where a high proportion of 
early school leavers is considered a problem. Reducing the proportion of pupils with a low 
level of schooling has been a priority of the recent governments. For example, since 1999, a 
means-tested allowance (Education Maintenance Allowance) is provided for children aged 
16 to 18 staying in education (see DfES, 2002, for an evaluation of EMA).  
In our sample, the proportions of individuals leaving school at 16 are 21 per cent for 
girls and 31 per cent for boys over the period (focusing on 17 year old pupils to limit 
measurement error). The national post-compulsory education in 1998 was 73 per cent and 
66 per cent for 16 years old females and males respectively (DfES). As expected, focusing 
on children living with their parents leads to a sample of higher achievers, especially for 
girls. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the staying-on rate over time. A general upward trend 
in achievement can be observed for girls but not for boys. An important gender gap in 
achievement is noticeable, with boys 10 percentage points less likely to remain in post-
compulsory education. 
The Education Act of 1972 extended the minimum school leaving age in England and 
Wales from 15 to 16. The first individuals affected were born on September 1957; their 
older peers could leave during the summer break, while they had to stay for an extra year of 
schooling. Compliance to the reform was high (see Harmon and Walker, 1995). As seen in 
Figure 2, this policy change creates a discontinuity in the years of education attained at the 
parental generation.  As expected, there is a noticeable jump in completed schooling for 
                                                           
12 This dichotomous variable is defined as being currently in education or having left full time education after the 
age of 16. 
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children born after the reform was implemented. Scotland changed its minimum school 
leaving age from 15 to 16 three year later13. Thus, there is some (limited) variation in the 
timing of the reform, which allows us to disentangle trend and reform effects. 
At the pre-reform generation, about 40 per cent of parents left education at the first 
opportunity (see Table 1). In our selected sample, the change in the school leaving age led 
to a reduction in the probability of attaining higher level of education, but this is only an 
artefact due to the sample selection. As more educated parents tend to have children at an 
older age, the sample of parents born after September 1957 with children aged 16 to 18 is 
disproportionately less educated.  Since fathers tend to be older than mothers, only 13 per 
cent of fathers experienced the minimum school leaving age of 16 compared to 25 per cent 
of mothers. It is also important to note that prior to the reform the proportion of pupils 
leaving school at 15 was decreasing. For example, for the cohort born between 1943 and 
1947, 55 per cent of men left school at 15, but this proportion is down to 38 per cent for the 
cohort born ten years later. Due to this trend, it is important to control for parental birth 
cohort in a model of intergenerational educational mobility. We do so by including a 
quadratic function in parental birth year in both stages; in some models these functions are 
interacted with RoSLA to create additional instruments. 
Focusing on the intergenerational schooling attainment, Table 2 reports the proportion 
of children with some post-compulsory education, by years of parental education. For both 
parents and school leaving age groups, a positive relationship between parental education 
and the child’s investment in post-compulsory schooling exists. For example, whilst 68 per 
cent of children with a father in the SLA 15 cohort, whose father left school at 15, have had 
some post-compulsory schooling, this proportion is 97 per cent if their father went to 
                                                           
13 Since the country where education was completed is not reported, we use current country of residence to 
determine whether individuals were affected by the RoSLA. This creates some measurement error. However, 
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university. The effects of both parents education on the decision of children to remain in 
post-compulsory education are similar in magnitude. A similar intergenerational link is 
found for the post-reform cohort. However, at all levels of parental education, children 
whose parents faced a school leaving age of 16 are less likely to be in post-compulsory 
education, than those with pre-reform parents. The difference is the largest for children 
whose parents left school at 16. This reflects that parents leaving school at 16 are, on 
average, of lower ability after the reform than before.  Additionally, the reduction of the 
parental influence may be due to their younger age and be just an income effect. 
Table 3 confirms the assumption that the probability of the offspring remaining in 
post-compulsory education is correlated with parental age. Despite the lower educational 
achievement of older parents, their children are more likely to remain in education than 
those with younger parents. It is thus crucial to control for parental birth cohort. 
 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Base results 
 
As completed education is not observed for the second generation, the focus is on attending 
post-compulsory education.  This dichotomous variable is observed for all children and a probit 
model is estimated. The exogenous variables include dummies for the year and month the 
interview took place, region of residence and age and gender of the teenager, as well as 
quadratic functions in parental birth cohort. The estimates of interest are ßS (see equation (1)) 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
mobility is limited. Most recent Labour Force Surveys reveal that 86% of individuals living in Scotland were born 
there, and 85% of Scottish born individuals live in Scotland. 
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respectively for the mother and the father. Contrary to Black et al. (2003) or Oreopoulos et al. 
(2003), we only focus on models including both parents’ education to eliminate assortative 
mating bias. Thus, we initially restrict the population of interest to teenagers living with both 
parents.  
Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects of each year of parental education on the 
probability of attending post-compulsory education for three different models. The base model 
only includes parental years of education as additional determinants. The second model adds the 
logarithm of father’s weekly pay and variables to control for labour force participation of the 
parents. The third model is completed with information on the neighbourhood (proxied by the 
local tax code) as well as the number of dependent children in the household.  The additional 
variables introduced in model 2 and 3 can be thought of as being endogenous since they are 
correlated with parental education. Rather than having a causal interpretation, these variables are 
included to test the possible channels through which parental education affects the child’s 
educational attainment.  Initially, each model is estimated assuming that parental education is 
exogenous, and then this assumption is relaxed.  
The models assuming endogeneity of parental education are identified by the school 
leaving age reform. In the first panel of Table 4, a dummy for the post-reform cohort is used as 
an instrument, thus assuming that after controlling for trends in parental education, the reform 
shifted the educational attainment of all post-reform cohorts uniformly. Panel B relaxes this 
assumption of homogeneity of the treatment effect, as the reform dummy is interacted with the 
quadratic function in parental birth cohort.  
In the first model, assuming exogeneity of parental education, each year of parental 
education increases the probability of staying on by just under 4 percentage points. Father’s and 
mother’s influences on their children are not statistically different from each other. These results 
are quite similar to those of Black et al. (2003). Adding measures for parental participation to 
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the labour force and paternal pay (model 2) has no effect on the estimated coefficients, which 
remain almost identical to those obtained for model 1. Doubling the paternal wage has almost 
the same effect on the probability of remaining in education as having a father with an extra two 
years of education (+6.3 percentage points). Having a working mother substantially increases 
the staying on probability, which is consistent with an income effect, a role model played by the 
mother, or some ethos of the family. Nevertheless, the intensity of parental participation has a 
small negative impact, statistically significant only for fathers; each additional ten hours of 
paternal work reduces the child’s probability of staying on by 0.9 percentage points. The effect 
of parental education is not solely due to an income effect. 
Pupils living in higher tax bound houses are more likely to remain in higher education. 
This is consistent with Gibbons’ (2002) findings on neighbourhood effects in education. The 
inclusion of the number of sibling and tax code has a marginal impact on the estimated effect of 
parental education, which is reduced to three percentage points.  
In these three models, parental education was treated as an exogenous variable but this 
assumption is now relaxed.  In panel A, each parent’s education is instrumented by a variable 
indicating whether this parent faced a minimum school leaving age of 15 or 16. The estimated 
effects of the reform on parental years of education are reported at the bottom of Table 4A. 
Parents affected by the reform have 0.3 years more schooling than pre-reform parents. These 
coefficients are highly significant and pass the rule of thumb for a weak instrument (Bound et al, 
1995). The correlation between the residuals of the two parental education equations is high at 
0.55. This is not surprising as parents tend to belong to neighbouring cohorts and therefore 
experienced similar circumstances. Furthermore, similarities in the unobserved characteristics of 
parents may explain their choice of education and their decision to mate.  
For mothers, the estimated effect of education remains almost identical to the one 
estimated in the exogenous model, but without the precision. Fathers’ education on the other 
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hand becomes insignificant and potentially negative, especially in the less parsimonious model. 
Due to the lack of precision of the paternal estimates and the similarities between the IV and 
exogenous estimates for mothers, the endogeneity of parental education is rejected either jointly 
or individually.  
As stated above, this identification strategy assumes that the effect of the reform on the 
schooling achievement of parents is identical for all post-reform cohorts. To relax this 
assumption, interactions between the quadratic function in the year of birth and the dummy for 
post-reform cohort are also included as instruments in the first stage. These estimates are 
reported in Table 4B. The models assuming exogeneity of parental education are also reported 
to facilitate comparisons.  
The estimates on the reform and interaction terms in the first stage are imprecise, 
nevertheless F-tests on their joint significance are between 26 and 53 in Model 1, so they are a 
valid group of instruments.  A year of maternal education significantly increases her child’s 
propensity of staying on by 8 to 10 percentage points. These estimates are precisely estimated 
and significantly different from zero. Father’s effects are also larger than in the models 
presented in panel A, but are imprecisely estimated and bounce between -0.02 and 0.02. These 
results suggest that the reform did not have a uniform impact on the schooling achievement of 
all post-reform cohorts and accounting for the trend in education leads to more precise 
estimates. 
Over-identification tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that all instruments lead to the 
same estimates which is not surprising since all instruments are functions of RoSLA. Finally, 
despite mother’s estimate being twice as large in the 2SLS model, the endogeneity of parental 
education is rejected either jointly or individually.  
Assuming a positive correlation between parental education and the error term (due for 
example to genetic effects), the probit estimates should be biased upwards; it is thus surprising 
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that the IV estimates are larger. However, this is consistent with a LATE interpretation, as 
parents affected by the school leaving age reform are likely to have had a lower taste for 
education than the average parent. Assuming decreasing returns to parental education on their 
children, the reform compliers would have higher returns than average14. Since children whose 
parents have a low taste for education are also the one most at risk of leaving school at the first 
opportunity, these estimates are of interest.   
In both types of identification, we find a larger impact of maternal education than paternal 
education, consistent with the common wisdom that mothers spend more time with their 
children than fathers do. These results are in contradiction with recent evidence that have 
suggested that paternal effects on the educational choice of the second generation were larger 
than maternal effects. The effect of maternal education appears to be causal and IV estimates are 
twice as large as estimates based on the assumption of the exogeneity of parental education. 
Furthermore, the effect of education is direct as models accounting for possible channels of 
transmission lead to similar results.  
The above results may be affected by the family structure; more precisely we test the 
hypothesis that non-natural parents are less altruistic (Case et al., 2000). The data only records 
the following three statuses on the relationship between child and parents: (1) natural or adoptee, 
(2) step child, (3) foster child.  Only 824 (134) fathers (mothers) were non-natural, leading to a 
rather small sample of children living with at least one non-natural parent, mostly a step-father. 
We drop the 43 children living with foster parents (see Table 5).   
In the exogenous model, children with step-parents benefit more from the schooling of 
their natural parent; this is especially the case for natural mother’s education. The natural parent 
may compensate for the lower attention of the step-parent. When assuming endogeneity of 
                                                           
14 Oreopoulos et al. (2003) provide some evidence of decreasing parental returns by estimating the effect of change 
in SLA at various ages. The lower the new school leaving age, the larger the parental effect on children’s 
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parental education, step-mothers’ education has no effect at all on the educational attainment of 
her step-children and step-fathers’ education has a large detrimental effect. These estimates are 
rather imprecise due to the small sample size. The instruments also appear to be weak in this set-
up.   
For natural parents, results are substantially different from those presented in Table 4B. 
Both parents’ education matters to the same extent; each year of parental schooling increases the 
probability of staying on by about 8 percentage points. These estimates are significantly 
different from zero at the 10 per cent confidence interval. The lack of significance of paternal 
education in the full sample was solely due to the inclusion of step-fathers. Focusing on natural 
parents only, there is no difference in the causal effect of parental education on their children15. 
As in Case et al. (2000), non-natural parents are found to be less altruistic, it is thus important to 
control for the relationship of children and the parental figures before assessing intergenerational 
effects. As policies will affect all children, we thereafter present results for both sub-samples. 
 
5.2  Testing the identification validity 
 
The identification strategy assumes that parents increased their schooling when affected by the 
change in minimum school leaving age reform. In this section, we document the validity of the 
identifying strategy by focusing on the group of parents the most likely to have been affected by 
the reform. First, we restrict the sample to children with both parents born five (two) years 
before or after the reform. Second, assuming that signalling in education is limited, the reform 
should have only a marginal effect on the education investment of parents with high level of 
schooling.   
                                                                                                                                                                                          
educational attainment. 
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Educational attainment has been increasing at the parental generation; thus it would be 
possible that the school leaving age reform has no identifying power and that our previous 
results are driven by cohort effects, despite our attempts to control for them. To test this 
assumption, the sample is reduced to children with both parents born in the close vicinity of the 
reform (five or two years) and living in England and Wales only. From the exogenous models, 
reported in columns two and four of Table 6, it can be noted that the estimates of the effect of 
parental education on the propensity to invest in post-compulsory education are between 1 and 
1.5 percentage points higher than for the full sample. Compared to the full population, parents 
born around the reform are younger; for example, with the five years window, 2/3rd of fathers 
are born before the left bound of the window but only 2 per cent are trimmed by the upper 
bound. 
Since we concentrate on a few cohorts of parents, the instrument chosen to identify the 
exogenous effect of education is simply whether the parent was affected by the reform (like 
model (1) in Table 4A).  The first stage estimates of the effect of the reform on schooling are 
similar to those obtained for the full population. The estimated effects of maternal education on 
children’s investment in post-compulsory education are almost identical those obtained with the 
full sample when interactions were also used as instruments. Thus the fully interacted model 
accounts for trends in educational attainment and is the favoured model. 
For paternal education, the results are more ambiguous. Using the five year period, the 
estimated effect reaches -7 percentage points but 1.5 per cent for the smaller window. The lack 
of precision and large variation of the estimates is largely due to the small number of fathers 
affected by the reform. As fathers are on average one year older than mothers (in the five years 
window sample), the sample is disproportionately composed of pre-reform fathers and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
15 None of the previous conclusions for Table 4 are affected by restricting the sample to natural parents only. The 
only difference is that paternal effects are larger and more precisely estimated in the restricted sample whilst 
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instruments are weaker for fathers than mothers. In the second panel of Table 6, we report 
results when restricting the sample to children living with both natural parents. They are not 
significantly different to those obtained for all children. 
As a second check, the sample is split between parents most likely to have had their 
schooling decision influenced by the reform and other parents.  If, as suggested by Chevalier et 
al. (2003), individuals with higher taste for education did not increase their schooling attainment 
after the reform in order to provide a signal of their ability, only individuals with low level of 
schooling would have increased their education when affected by the change in SLA. Table 7 
reports the results on the effect of the reform on parental education for children whose parents 
left education at or before the age of 17, and for children whose parents left school after the age 
of 17. As expected, the reform has no effect on the educational attainment of parents with high 
level of schooling, and a large positive effect (adding 0.4 years of education) for the parents 
directly affected.  
These tests support the validity of the identification strategy; the reform of the school 
leaving age created an exogenous increase in parental education. However, the effect of the 
reform on post-reform cohorts is not homogenous, so it is important to fully control for trends in 
educational attainment. Additionally, as suggested previously, only a subgroup of the population 
complied with the reform and changed their education, thus the instrumental variable estimates 
can only be interpreted as a LATE. 
 
5.3 Further results. 
 
Due to the non-linearity in the effect of the reform, the additional results are based on the 
models where the identification variables are the SLA reform and the interactions between 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
maternal effects are somehow reduced (see Appendix 2). 
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RoSLA and a quadratic function in parental birth cohort. Since additional variables are 
potentially endogenous and do not change our results, the following results are based on model 
(1). The regression is conducted separately for the three age groups in our data. The concerns are 
first misreporting of educational attainment for the 16 year old group, where some children may 
not yet have been able to make a decision regarding post-compulsory schooling16; second, 
selection issue, which gets more stringent as children age.  Children with more caring parents 
will be more likely to invest in education and also to stay home, thus biasing upwards the 
estimated parental effect. Table 8 reports the estimates for the three age groups separately.  
Assuming the exogeneity of parental education, the estimates obtained at age 16 are 
significantly reduced compared to those for children aged 17 and 18. Conform to the increased 
selection of the sample, as children age, the effect of parental education increases, for example, 
the estimate of maternal schooling, for the 18 year old group is one percentage point higher than 
for children aged 17.  However, when relaxing the exogeneity hypothesis, this pattern 
disappears, suggesting that selection does not bias the estimated parental effects upwards. On 
the contrary, parental effects are the largest for the youngest children with an extra year of 
maternal schooling increasing the probability of post-compulsory schooling by 12 percentage 
points. Paternal effects are much lower and not statistically different from zero. The instruments 
are weaker for older children, and the estimates become imprecise; children remaining longer in 
the parental nest are likely to have parents with higher taste for education and thus their 
education was less affected by the reform. 
For the most restrictive sample of children living with natural parents, no clear pattern can 
be observed. Only maternal effects for 16 year old are statistically significant, but the point 
estimates for older children are in the same ball park. The estimated paternal effects range from 
                                                           
16 In limited dependent variable models, mismeasurement in the dependent variables lead to biased estimates 
(Hausman, 2001). 
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4 to 7 percentage points but are rather imprecise.  To summarise, splitting the population by age 
group does not indicate that selection effects bias our estimates substantially, as the point 
estimates are similar to those obtained on the full sample and do not indicate significant pattern. 
 
 
6 Further Results 
 
As parental effect may be gender specific, the base model is run separately for sons and 
daughters. The common wisdom states that same-sex intergenerational links are the strongest. 
Black et al. (2003) on the contrary estimate a positive effect of mother’s education only on their 
sons. Note that differences by sex in the effect of parental education are not compatible with a 
pure genetic model.  
In the probit models, there is no evidence that mother’s schooling has a stronger impact on 
daughters than on sons. The effect of either parent’s education is slightly more important on 
sons than daughters, maybe because male participation in post-compulsory education is lower 
than female participation. However, when instrumenting parental education, a different pattern 
emerges.  For girls, paternal education becomes close to nil, whilst maternal education increases. 
For boys, both parental education attainments increase the probability of post-compulsory 
education by nine percentage points (imprecisely estimated). However, when focusing on the 
sample of children living with both natural parents, paternal effect on son’s education is greatly 
increased and reaches an insignificant 16 percentage points whilst the maternal effect is 
somehow reduced. These results are consistent with models where the same-sex parent plays a 
role model for the teenager or where parents exhibit preferences for same sex children.  
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) highlight that education affects the choice of partners. 
This point has so far been neglected since we have assumed that the identifying strategy 
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accounts for assortative mating. As a test, we estimate our favoured model for children living 
with a single parent (Table 10). In the exogenous model, single parent’s education has twice as 
much effect on the child’s probability of attending some post-compulsory education than that of 
married parents.  However, when assuming endogeneity of parental education, maternal effect 
remains at around 0.07 whilst paternal effects become negative, as in the full sample model. 
Instrumenting each parents’ education and estimating the first stage equations jointly has 
allowed us to control effectively for assortative mating. Alternatively, these results may simply 
indicate that assortative mating is not an issue. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
As in other studies, we initially find that parental education has a significant effect on their 
children’s educational attainment; increasing parental education by one year increases the 
probability of staying on by 4 percentage points. We identify the exogenous effect of parental 
education by relying on changes in compulsory school leaving age.  This identification strategy 
estimates a local average treatment effect, since only parents who wished to leave school at 15, 
those with either a lower taste for education, a lower ability or a financial constraint, were 
affected by the reform.  The IV estimates are therefore not directly comparable to the initial 
estimates.   
Assuming the endogeneity of parental education leads to estimates of mother’s effect on 
the decision to remain in post-compulsory education that are twice as large. In almost all the 
models presented, we reject the endogeneity of parental education. Maternal education thus has 
a causal effect on the education of her children. Paternal education on the other hand becomes 
close to zero or even negative in most models. However, when focusing only on natural parents, 
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paternal education has as large an effect as maternal education and both are significantly 
different from zero. Furthermore, the effect of maternal education is larger for daughters while 
paternal education matters for sons’ educational decision only, suggesting a role model played 
by same sex parents. These estimates are consistent both for different age groups and children 
with different family structures, suggesting that they are not affected by selection effects.  We 
also provide some evidence that the identification strategy is valid and not solely due to trends in 
educational attainment. A remaining research issue is to identify whether increased parental 
education improve parental skills or simply change the value that parents attach to the education 
of their children. Tentatively, controls for financial situation, labour market attachment, fertility 
and neighbourhood were introduced. Assuming that all these variables had an exogenous effect, 
the impact of parental education remains unchanged. 
The estimates of the effect of parental education on their children’s educational attainment 
are that each year of education increases the probability of staying on by 4 to 8 percentage 
points. How do these estimates compare with other policies implemented in the UK and with 
estimates of parental education available in the literature? The education maintenance allowance 
experiment, introduced in the UK at the end of the Nineties, has increased participation of 16 to 
18 year old in the treated area by 6 percentage points17 (DfES, 2002), which is equivalent to 
increasing one parent’s education by one or two years. The population affected by EMA is likely 
to be similar to the one for which our IV strategy is valid since EMA is means tested and 
targeted at the poorest children, the parents of whom are likely to have had a low level of 
schooling.  
Oreopoulos et al. (2004) estimate a reduction in the probability of grade repeat between 
five and eight percentage points. Bjorklund et al. (2004), report estimates of maternal effect on 
                                                           
17 EMA is an experiment currently conducted in England where children aged 16 to 18 receive a means-tested 
financial support of up to £40/week if staying in post-compulsory education.  
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probability of going to university reaching 6 percentage points. Other studies typically report 
years of education. Using EMA evidence, 63 per cent of the pupils receiving support, registered 
in a short vocational course rather than followed the academic track, and 10 per cent dropped 
out by the end of the first year.  Assuming that all vocational courses last two years, and that 
half of the students on the academic track eventually graduate from university (five years), 
whilst the remaining stop after A-levels (two years), we compute the effect of increasing 
parental education on the years of education completed. In such a scenario, assuming that 
individuals not directly affected by the change in parental education do not change their 
education decision, the 4 to 8 percentage points increase in post-compulsory education is 
equivalent to an average increase of 0.1 to 0.2 years of education for the whole population. This 
is in line with the estimates between 0.05 and 0.20 found in the literature.  
Contrary to some recent estimates, we find that both parents’ education has a causal 
impact on the schooling attainment of their children, when focusing on natural parents only, and 
that for the population of interest, the effects are twice as large as when assuming the exogeneity 
of parental education. Whilst these estimates are only valid for parents with a lower taste for 
education, and are likely to overestimate the effect of a reform affecting all parents, they are of 
interest, since they are relevant for the population targeted by recent policies in Britain.  
Increasing education has positive effects on the next generation.  These long-term effects should 
be taken into account when estimating the social rate of returns to education.  
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Table 1 Parental schooling distribution by cohort 
 
Father  
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
   
Age left school 1938-1942 1943-1947 1948-1952 1953-1957 1958-1962 1963-1967 
       
15 55.2 43.7 39.4 38.1 1.3 0 
       
16 17.4 20.9 25.1 31.3 79.0 83.3 
       
17-18 11.4 13.9 14.4 15.8 12.3 11.4 
       
19-20 3.4 3.8 3.7 4.3 2.2 1.6 
       
21-22 5.5 9.3 10.7 7.3 3.7 2.4 
       
23+ 6.7 8.4 6.5 3.7 1.4 1.2 
       
Obs 1250 2545 4298 3458 1487 245 
       
 
 
Mother  
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
   
Age left school 1938-1942 1943-1947 1948-1952 1953-1957 1958-1962 1963-1967 
       
15 58.5 40.3 34.9 37.2 0.8 0 
       
16 17.4 22.0 26.3 29.4 75.8 83.5 
       
17-18 13.0 19.0 17.5 20.6 18.2 13.7 
       
19-20 1.5 3.5 4.0 4.2 2.2 1.4 
       
21-22 7.2 12.1 14.4 7.1 2.1 1.3 
       
23+ 2.5 2.7 2.7 1.5 0.6 0.1 
       
Obs 484 1840 4563 5298 3305 728 
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Table 2 Intergenerational schooling choices 
 
 
 
Proportion with post-compulsory 
schooling 
Proportion with post-compulsory 
schooling 
Age parent  Father Mother 
left school SLA 15 SLA 16 SLA15 SLA16 
     
15 68.24 - 67.32 - 
     
16 80.33 69.21 79.27 68.12 
     
17 87.10 86.11 86.52 85.64 
     
18 91.40 87.76 92.30 89.61 
     
19-21 96.44 94.87 97.19 96.30 
     
22-25 97.33 92.21 97.37 98.00 
     
Observations 11662 1632 12376 3866 
     
 
 
 
Table 3 Parental cohort and proportion of children with post-compulsory education 
 
 
 Parental cohort % child in education 
  Dad Observation Mother Observation 
      
Born 38-42 80.40 1250 78.72 484 
     
Born 42-47 81.57 2545 82.45 1840 
     
Born 48-52 80.90 4298 81.39 4563 
     
Pre-reform 
Born 53-57 76.95 3458 77.99 5298 
      
Born 58-62 72.70 1487 72.34 3305 
     
Post-reform 
Born 63-67 72.65 245 71.15 728 
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Table 4A Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling 
Children living with both parents 
 
Panel: A Instrument: Leaving age reform 
 Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
Mother’s schooling 0.039 
(0.003) 
0.037 
(0.050) 
0.037 
(0.003) 
0.038 
(0.052) 
0.029 
(0.003) 
0.044 
(0.049) 
Father’s schooling 0.036 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.059) 
0.033 
(0.002) 
-0.015 
(0.056) 
0.027 
(0.002) 
-0.055 
(0.072) 
Father’s incomeA   0.063 
(0.008) 
0.121 
(0.070) 
0.042 
(0.008) 
0.084 
(0.057) 
Father’s hours 
worked *100 
  -0.089 
(0.032) 
-0.169 
(0.072) 
-0.095 
(0.032) 
-0.184 
(0.104) 
Mother works   0.094 
(0.058) 
0.122 
(0.085) 
0.067 
(0.055) 
0.091 
(0.074) 
Mother’s hours 
worked *100 
  -0.010 
(0.030) 
0.023 
(0.108) 
0.023 
(0.030) 
0.036 
(0.109) 
Council tax 
dummies: ?2(8) 
    98.63 
Pr = 0 
61.19 
Pr = 0 
Nbr dependent 
children 
    0.075 
(0.005) 
0.084 
(0.018) 
Excluded 
Instrument (F test)B 
 Dad: 11.6 
Mom: 25.7 
 Dad: 12.8 
Mom: 25.1 
 Dad: 10.0 
Mom:26.7 
Exog. Test (?2)C  
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
1.89 pr = .39 
1.81 pr=.18 
0.26 pr=.61 
  
1.77 pr = .41 
1.72 pr=.19 
0.21 pr=.65 
  
2.31 pr = .31 
2.25 pr=.13 
0.05 pr=.82 
       
1st stage equations       
Dad SLA 16  0.314 
(0.092) 
 0.322 
(0.090) 
 0.279 
(0.088) 
Mom SLA 16  0.328 
(0.065) 
 0.318 
(0.064) 
 0.323 
(0.062) 
 
Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents (12593 observations). The IV first stage 
regressions are estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in 
compulsory education after the SLA reform. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic 
function in father and mother’s age, gender and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and 
dummies for administrative region of residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 
replications). 
A: Dad weekly log pay. Also include dummy for missing pay, dad self employed (pay not reported) and dad not 
working. 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in each of the first stage regression. 
C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from each first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the 
residual series are zero.  The residuals are also introduced separately and their significance tested. 
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Table 4B Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling 
Children living with both parents 
 
Panel: B Instrument: school reform and interaction with parental age 
 Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
Mother’s schooling 0.039 
(0.003) 
0.106 
(0.037) 
0.037 
(0.003) 
0.088 
(0.041) 
0.029 
(0.003) 
0.081 
(0.044) 
Father’s schooling 0.036 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.059) 
0.033 
(0.002) 
0.020 
(0.041) 
0.027 
(0.002) 
-0.023 
(0.055) 
Father’s incomeA   0.063 
(0.008) 
0.025 
(0.040) 
0.042 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.037) 
Father’s hours 
worked *100 
  -0.089 
(0.032) 
-0.033 
(0.068) 
-0.095 
(0.032) 
-0.020 
(0.067) 
Mother works   0.094 
(0.058) 
0.015 
(0.059) 
0.067 
(0.055) 
0.008 
(0.055) 
Mother’s hours 
worked *100 
  -0.010 
(0.030) 
-0.079 
(0.087) 
0.023 
(0.030) 
-0.065 
(0.087) 
Council tax 
dummies: ?2(8) 
    98.63 
Pr = 0 
61.36 
Pr = 0 
Nbr dependent 
children 
    0.075 
(0.005) 
0.060 
(0.011) 
Excluded 
Instrument (F test)B 
 Dad: 26.1 
Mom: 53.2 
 Dad: 24.1 
Mom: 41.8 
 Dad: 14.8 
Mom:37.2 
Exog. Test : (?2)C 
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
1.80 pr=0.40 
0.04 pr=.84 
1.74 pr.19 
  
0.89 pr = .64 
0.00 pr=.99 
0.81 pr=.37 
  
1.41 pr = .49 
0.38 pr=.54 
0.63 pr=.43 
Hansen J: (?2)D  2.81 pr = .59  3.17 pr = .53  3.51 pr=.48 
 
Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents (12593 observations). The IV first stage 
regressions are estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in 
compulsory education after the SLA reform and the interactions of this dummy with a quadratic function in parental 
birth cohort. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic function in father and mother’s age, 
gender and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and dummies for administrative region of 
residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications). 
A: Dad weekly log pay. Also include dummy for missing pay, dad self employed (pay not reported) and dad not 
working. 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in each of the first stage regression. 
C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from each first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the 
residual series are zero.  The residuals are also introduced separately and their significance tested. 
D: Hansen J statistics is distributed as a (?2) and was obtained by estimating a linear model by GMM. Results from 
this estimation were almost identical to those presented. 
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Table 5 Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling: 
Natural and step-children 
 
 2 natural parents Step mother Step-father 
 Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
       
Mother’s schooling 0.037 
(0.003) 
0.076 
(0.037) 
0.020 
(0.027) 
-0.002 
(0.100) 
0.061 
(0.014) 
0.061 
(0.172) 
       
Father’s schooling 0.036 
(0.002) 
0.078 
(0.044) 
0.038 
(0.020) 
0.055 
(0.226) 
0.044 
(0.012) 
-0.173 
(0.162) 
       
Excluded Instrument  
(F test)B 
 Dad: 24.9 
Mum: 47.7 
 Dad: 1.33 
Mum: 9.10 
 Dad: 6.11 
Mum: 7.46 
       
Endogeneity TestC 
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
3.19 pr=.20 
3.14 pr=0.08 
0.76 pr=.38 
  
0.14 pr=.93 
0.00 pr=.99 
0.13 pr=.72 
  
4.69 pr=.09 
4.69 pr=.03 
0.01 pr=.90 
       
Hansen J: (?2)D  2.98 pr=.56  2.42 pr=.66  4.84 pr=.30 
       
Observations 11460 11460 147 147 824 824 
 
Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents. The IV first stage regressions are 
estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in compulsory 
education after the SLA reform and the interactions of this dummy with a quadratic function in parental birth 
cohort. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic function in father and mother’s age, gender 
and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and dummies for administrative region of 
residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications). 
A: Dad weekly log pay. Also include dummy for missing pay, dad self employed (pay not reported) and dad not 
working. 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in each of the first stage regression. 
C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from each first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the 
residual series are zero.  The residuals are also introduced separately and their significance tested. 
D: Hansen J statistics is distributed as a (?2) and was obtained by estimating a linear model by GMM. Results from 
this estimation were almost identical to those presented. 
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Table 6 Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling 
Children living with both parents – Size of the window around reform 
 
All children Both parents born 5 years 
around the reform 
Both parents born 2 years 
around the reform 
 Probit IV Probit IV 
     
Mother’s schooling 0.049 
(0.007) 
0.081 
(0.074) 
0.053 
(0.010) 
0.101 
(0.091) 
     
Father’s schooling 0.047 
(0.006) 
-0.071 
(0.154) 
0.052 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.103) 
     
Excluded Instrument  
(F test)B 
 Dad: 4.50 
Mum: 21.2 
 Dad: 10.1 
Mum: 18.9 
     
Endogeneity TestC 
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
1.10 pr=.57 
1.08 pr=.30 
0.00 pr=.94 
  
0.33 pr=.85 
0.24 pr=.62 
0.08 pr=.78 
     
Observations 3590 3590 2104 2104 
     
1st stage equations     
     
Dad SLA 16  0.253 
(0.119) 
 0.445 
(0.140) 
     
Mom SLA 16  0.402 
(0.087) 
 0.498 
(0.114) 
   
 
 
Continued over page 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
 
Natural children only   
     
Mother’s schooling 0.048 
(0.007) 
0.080 
(0.117) 
0.054 
(0.011) 
0.099 
(0.155) 
     
Father’s schooling 0.048 
(0.006) 
-0.126 
(0.377) 
0.053 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.113) 
     
Excluded Instrument  
(F test)B 
 Dad: 2.4 
Mum: 17.6 
 Dad: 8.7 
Mum: 14.6 
     
Endogeneity TestC 
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
1.66 pr=.44 
1.66 pr=.20 
0.00 pr=.99 
  
0.42 pr=.82 
0.40 pr=.53 
0.02 pr=.90 
     
Observations 3238 3238 1914 1914 
     
1st stage equations     
     
Dad SLA 16  0.199 
(0.127) 
 0.433 
(0.147) 
     
Mom SLA 16  0.380 
(0.091) 
 0.454 
(0.119) 
 
Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents. The IV first stage regressions are 
estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in compulsory 
education after the SLA reform. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic function in father 
and mother’s age, gender and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and dummies for 
administrative region of residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications). 
The regression is based on England and Wales only. 
For additional information, see note for Table 4. 
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Table 7 Effect of school leaving age reform on parental education, by  
education group 
 
 Parents leaving education 
at 17 or before  
Parents who left school 
after the age of 17 
   
Mother’s SLA 0.439 
(0.026) 
-0.142 
(0.199) 
   
Father’s SLA 0.411 
(0.030) 
-0.057 
(0.288) 
   
Observations 8339 2558 
   
 
Note: The model contains the following additional control: quadratic function in father and mother’s age, gender 
and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and dummies for administrative region of 
residence. The model was estimated for children with both parents leaving school before or at the age of 17, and for 
those with both parents leaving school after the age of 17. 
 
Table 8 Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling 
Children living with both parents, by age of child 
 
All children Age 16 Age17 Age 18 
 Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
       
Mother’s schooling 0.026 
(0.004) 
0.117 
(0.052) 
0.044 
(0.004) 
0.082 
(0.042) 
0.054 
(0.006) 
0.065 
(0.177) 
       
Father’s schooling 0.025 
(0.003) 
0.028 
(0.049) 
0.043 
(0.005) 
-0.030 
(0.058) 
0.040 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.111) 
       
Excluded Instrument (F 
test)B 
 Dad: 12.40 
Mum: 22.44 
 Dad: 11.85 
Mum:31.81 
 Dad:7.05 
Mum: 7.20 
       
Endogeneity TestC 
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
3.00 pr= .22 
0.22 pr=.64 
3.00 pr=.08 
  
1.02 pr=.60 
0.88 pr=.35 
0.00 pr=.97 
  
0.08 pr=.96 
0.04 pr=.85 
0.07 pr=.79 
       
Hansen J: (?2)D  0.91 pr=.92  1.58 pr=.81  4.95 pr=.29 
       
Observations 4635 4635 4369 4369 3589 3589 
Continued over page 
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Table 8 Continued 
 
       
Natural children only    
    
Mother’s schooling 0.025 
(0.003) 
0.072 
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.005) 
0.053 
(0.051) 
0.049 
(0.006) 
0.081 
(0.103) 
       
Father’s schooling 0.025 
(0.003) 
0.068 
(0.057) 
0.043 
(0.004) 
0.037 
(0.073) 
0.041 
(0.005) 
0.052 
(0.076) 
       
Excluded Instrument (F 
test)B 
 Dad: 9.71 
Mum: 23.87 
 Dad: 11.07 
Mum:24.42 
 Dad:8.90 
Mum: 8.64 
       
Endogeneity TestC 
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
2.07 pr= .33 
1.90 pr=.17 
0.85 pr=.35 
  
0.32 pr=.85 
0.10 pr=.75 
0.12 pr=.73 
  
0.24 pr=.89 
0.24 pr=.63 
0.07 pr=.79 
       
Hansen J: (?2)D  4.36 pr=.36  1.00 pr=.80  1.93 pr=.75 
       
Observations 4187 4187 3966 3966 3307 3307 
 
Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents. The IV first stage regressions are 
estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in compulsory 
education after the SLA reform and the interactions of this dummy with a quadratic function in parental birth 
cohort. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic function in father and mother’s age, gender 
and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and dummies for administrative region of 
residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications). 
A: Dad weekly log pay. Also include dummy for missing pay, dad self employed (pay not reported) and dad not 
working. 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in each of the first stage regression. 
C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from each first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the 
residual series are zero.  The residuals are also introduced separately and their significance tested. 
D: Hansen J statistics is distributed as a (?2) and was obtained by estimating a linear model by GMM. Results from 
this estimation were almost identical to those presented. 
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Table 9 Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling 
Children living with both parents, by gender 
 
All Children Daughter Son 
 Probit IV Probit IV 
Mother’s schooling 0.036 
(0.004) 
0.127 
(0.053) 
0.043 
(0.004) 
0.087 
(0.059) 
     
Father’s schooling 0.028 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.051) 
0.043 
(0.004) 
0.090 
(0.098) 
     
Excluded Instrument  
(F test)B 
 Dad: 16.93 
Mum: 26.05 
 Dad: 11.95 
Mum: 29.26 
     
Endogeneity TestC 
Joint 
Father only 
Mopther only 
  
2.65 pr=.27 
0.07 pr=.80 
2.15 pr=.14 
  
1.53 pr=.46 
1.40 pr=.24 
0.60 pr=.44 
     
Hansen J: (?2)D  5.66 pr=.22  8.09 pr=.09 
     
Observations 6080 6080 6513 6513 
     
Natural Children only   
   
Mother’s schooling 0.029 
(0.004) 
0.125 
(0.051) 
0.042 
(0.004) 
0.046 
(0.057) 
     
Father’s schooling 0.029 
(0.003) 
0.023 
(0.038) 
0.041 
(0.004) 
0.162 
(0.109) 
     
Excluded Instrument  
(F test)B 
 Dad: 18.48 
Mum: 22.56 
 Dad: 8.51 
Mum: 27.79 
     
Endogeneity TestC 
Joint 
Father only 
Mopther only 
  
2.54 pr=.28 
0.45 pr=.50 
2.51 pr=.11 
  
4.53 pr=.10 
3.94 pr=.05 
0.02 pr=.88 
     
Hansen J: (?2)D  4.16 pr=.38  6.97 pr=.14 
     
Observations 5518 5518 5942 5942 
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Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents. The IV first stage regressions are 
estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in compulsory 
education after the SLA reform and the interactions of this dummy with a quadratic function in parental birth 
cohort. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic function in father and mother’s age, gender 
and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and dummies for administrative region of 
residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications). 
A: Dad weekly log pay. Also include dummy for missing pay, dad self employed (pay not reported) and dad not 
working. 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in each of the first stage regression. 
C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from each first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the 
residual series are zero.  The residuals are also introduced separately and their significance tested. 
D: Hansen J statistics is distributed as a (?2) and was obtained by estimating a linear model by GMM. Results from 
this estimation were almost identical to those presented. 
 
 
Table 10: Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling: 
Single parents 
 
 Single mother Single father 
 Probit IV Probit IV 
Mother’s schooling 0.088 
(0.006) 
0.071 
(0.051) 
  
     
Father’s schooling   0.060 
(0.012) 
-0.049 
(0.359) 
     
Excluded Instrument  
(F test)B 
 9.55  0.31  
     
Endogeneity TestC  0.067 pr=.79  0.31 pr=0.57 
     
Hansen J: (?2)D  3.75 pr=.15  0.99 pr=.61 
     
Observations 3649 3649 701 701 
 
Note: The model is estimated for individuals living with one parent only. The instruments include a dummy for 
minimum school leaving age, year of birth and interaction year of birth, SLA 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in a first stage regression 
C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from the first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on the residual 
series are zero.   
D: Hansen J statistics is distributed as a (?2) and was obtained by estimating a linear model by GMM. Results from 
this estimation were almost identical to those presented. 
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Figure 1 Proportion of 17 years old with post-compulsory schooling 
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Note: The year on the axis refers to the year the child was 16 
 
 
Figure 2 Years of schooling by birth cohort: Jan 1956- Dec 1958 
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Note: Source: LFS 1993-2001
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Appendix 1 Sample selection in FRS (1994-2002) 
 
 
A- Sample selection 
18,715   age 16-18 
17,634   Living with at least one parent 
16,943   Parents older than 15 when kid born or less than 55 
 
 
B- Selection issues due to family situation 
 
 Live with at 
least one parent 
Live with 
both parents 
Live with 
natural parents 
Live alone 
     
Left school at 15 or 
before 
7.21 6.55 6.49 26.27 
     
Currently in FT 
education 
70.45 79.31 80.13 24.61 
     
Female 48.50 48.28 48.15 69.75 
     
Age 16 37.28 36.81 36.54 9.62 
     
Age 17  34.68 34.69 34.61 27.94 
     
Age 18  28.05 28.50 28.86 62.44 
     
Observations 16,943 12,593 11,460 1,081 
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Appendix 2 Results for subsample of natural children only 
 
Table 4A Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling 
Natural Children living with both parents 
 
Panel: A Instrument: Leaving age reform 
 Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
       
Mother’s schooling 0.037 
(0.003) 
0.024 
(0.051) 
0.035 
(0.003) 
0.027 
(0.053) 
0.028 
(0.003) 
0.032 
(0.050) 
       
Father’s schooling 0.036 
(0.002) 
0.044 
(0.081) 
0.033 
(0.002) 
0.025 
(0.075) 
0.027 
(0.002) 
-0.018 
(0.098) 
       
Father’s incomeA   0.057 
(0.009) 
0.058 
(0.106) 
0.039 
(0.009) 
0.071 
(0.074) 
       
Father’s hours 
worked *100 
  -0.072 
(0.032) 
-0.108 
(0.102) 
-0.080 
(0.032) 
-0.158 
(0.134) 
       
Mother works   0.102 
(0.063) 
0.098 
(0.146) 
0.078 
(0.059) 
0.115 
(0.119) 
       
Mother’s hours 
worked *100 
  0.000 
(0.030) 
-0.009 
(0.153) 
0.036 
(0.030) 
8.921 
(9.757) 
       
Council tax 
dummies: ?2(8) 
    77.13 
Pr = 0 
49.62 
Pr = 0 
       
Nbr dependent 
children 
    0.075 
(0.005) 
0.089 
(0.026) 
       
Excluded 
Instrument (F test)B 
 Dad: 7.4 
Mom: 20.3 
 Dad: 8.2 
Mom: 18.6 
 Dad: 6.3 
Mom:19.8 
       
Exog. Test (?2)C  
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
0.62 pr = .73 
0.25 pr=.62 
0.49 pr=.48 
  
0.56 pr = .76 
0.27 pr=.60 
0.40 pr=.53 
  
0.64 pr = .73 
0.57 pr=.45 
0.17 pr=.68 
       
1st stage equations       
       
Dad SLA 16  0.269 
(0.099) 
 0.278 
(0.097) 
 0.239 
(0.095) 
       
Mom SLA 16  0.314 
(0.070) 
 0.295 
(0.068) 
 0.300 
(0.067) 
 
Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents (11460 observations). The IV first stage 
regressions are estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in 
 41 
compulsory education after the SLA reform. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic 
function in father and mother’s age, gender and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and 
dummies for administrative region of residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 
replications). 
A: Dad weekly log pay. Also include dummy for missing pay, dad self employed (pay not reported) and dad not 
working. 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in each of the first stage regression. 
C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from each first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the 
residual series are zero.  The residuals are also introduced separately and their significance tested. 
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Table A4 B Parent’s education and child’s probability of post-compulsory schooling. 
Natural Children living with both parents 
 
Panel: B Instrument: school reform and interaction with parental age 
 Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 
       
Mother’s schooling 0.037 
(0.003) 
0.076 
(0.035) 
0.035 
(0.003) 
0.060 
(0.040) 
0.028 
(0.003) 
0.053 
(0.041) 
       
Father’s schooling 0.036 
(0.002) 
0.078 
(0.044) 
0.033 
(0.002) 
0.077 
(0.051) 
0.027 
(0.002) 
0.056 
(0.065) 
       
Father’s incomeA   0.057 
(0.009) 
-0.055 
(0.062) 
0.039 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.050) 
       
Father’s hours 
worked *100 
  -0.072 
(0.032) 
-0.005 
(0.067) 
-0.080 
(0.032) 
-0.010 
(0.094) 
       
Mother works   0.102 
(0.063) 
-0.033 
(0.081) 
0.078 
(0.059) 
0.010 
(0.079) 
       
Mother’s hours 
worked *100 
  0.000 
(0.030) 
-0.166 
(0.102) 
0.036 
(0.030) 
-2.700 
(9.594) 
       
Council tax 
dummies: ?2(8) 
    77.13 
Pr = 0 
46.00 
Pr = 0 
       
Nbr dependent 
children 
    0.075 
(0.005) 
0.059 
(0.018) 
       
Excluded 
Instrument (F test)B 
 Dad: 24.9 
Mom: 47.7 
 Dad: 21.2 
Mom: 36.2 
 Dad: 12.8 
Mom:31.0 
       
Exog. Test : (?2)C 
Joint 
Father only 
Mother only 
  
3.19 pr=0.20 
3.14 pr=0.08 
0.76 pr=0.38 
  
2.54 pr = .28 
2.54 pr=.11 
0.34 pr=.56 
  
1.07 pr = .59 
1.03 pr=.31 
0.27 pr=.60 
       
Hansen J: (?2)D  2.97 pr = .56  3.38 pr = .50  4.21 pr=.38 
 
Note: The model is estimated by for individuals living with both parents (11460 observations). The IV first stage 
regressions are estimated simultaneously. For each parent, the instrument is a dummy taking the unit value if in 
compulsory education after the SLA reform and the interactions of this dummy with a quadratic function in parental 
birth cohort. The model contains the following additional control: quadratic function in father and mother’s age, 
gender and age of the child, dummies for years and month of interview, and dummies for administrative region of 
residence. Standard errors in the IV models are obtained by bootstrap (500 replications). 
A: Dad weekly log pay. Also include dummy for missing pay, dad self employed (pay not reported) and dad not 
working. 
B: Test of the joint significance of the instrument in each of the first stage regression. 
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C: Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity. The residuals from each first-stage regression are included in a 
probit model. Estimation of the model gives rise to a test for the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the 
residual series are zero.  The residuals are also introduced separately and their significance tested. 
D: Hansen J statistics is distributed as a (?2) and was obtained by estimating a linear model by GMM. Results from 
this estimation were almost identical to those presented. 
 
 
